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ABSTRACT
 
Faking good on personality measures has traditionally been
 
cdnceptualized as a threat to validity. However, many have called for
 
treating faking good as an individual difference variable that may be
 
predictive in its own right. Faking good is conceptuaily relate^ to
 
Self-Monitoring, Social Desirability, arid Impressiori Management. In the
 
present study, it was hypothesized that the tendericy to fake good on the
 
Big Five personality dimensions would ioe correlated with higher
 
on Self-Monitoring, Social Desirability, and Impression Management. The
 
method involved a repeated measures design. Time one was the ho^^^
 
condition where subjects completed a measure of the Big Five personality
 
dimensions with instructions to respond ho^n^^^^ timri two was the
 
condition where subject completed the same persbhality measure with
 
instructions to respond:as a job applicant attempting to give as good
 
impression as possible in order to obtain the job. Results indicate that
 
faking good, as measured by within-subject correlations between the
 
honest and fake conditions, was not sigriificantly correiated w^
 
constructs of Self-Monitoring, Social Desirability, nor Impression ;
 
Management. , Problems associated with the current measures of faking, as
 
well as implications for future research on the individual difference
 
variable of faking good are discussed.
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Introduction
 
Human resource selection includes,many potential methods of
 
assessment. Personality assessment is one such method, and is a dynamic
 
field of research. In past decades, the use of personality measures as
 
selection instruments has been held in poor regard because of their
 
questionable predictiveness of job related criteria {Guion & Cottier,
 
1966). This may have been due to the types of personality measures that
 
were used to predict job performance. These measures were typically
 
assessments of psychopathology (e.g., MMPI) rather than specific
 
categories of personality traits that could be linked to specific work
 
behaviors. However, researchers have switched from using
 
psychopatholigcal measures of personality to measures of normal range
 
personality traits (e.g., NEO PI); and more recently, the validity of
 
personality measures for predicting a variety of job related outcomes
 
has received empirical support (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Tett, Jackson, &
 
Rothstein, 1991). Recent research indicates that the validity of
 
personality measures is acceptable when the personality constructs
 
assessed are part of a widely accepted, unified framework of traits.
 
Barrick and Mount (1991) conducted a meta-analysis in order to
 
assess the validity of the Big Five personality dimensions
 
(Extraversion, Emotional Stability, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness,
 
and Intellect) as predictors of job performance. The criteria of job
 
performance included job proficiency, training proficiency, and
 
personnel data (e.g., salary level and turnover). The results of their
 
meta-analysis based on 117 studies and a total sample of 23,994 revealed
 
that conscientiousness was a valid predictor for all criteria across,all
 
job categories \p ranges from .20 to .23). In addition, they found that
 
extraversion was a valid predictor for all performance criteria for two
 
job types (managers and sales).
 
Tett, Jackson, and Rothstein (1991) found results similar to those
 
of Barrick and Mount (1991). However, their findings suggested that
 
Barrick and Mount's (1991) validities were underestimated. Tett, et al.
 
conducted a meta-analysis on 97 studies with 13,521 subjects to
 
determine the predictive validity of the Big Five personality
 
dimensions. Type A personality, and Locus of Control for job
 
performance. The overall validity coefficient for these personality
 
measures combined for job performance was .22. This validity coefficient
 
was,larger than Barrick and Mount's (1991), who looked at the validity
 
for each of the Big Five dimensions separately. Tett, et al. note that
 
Barrick and Mount's overall corrected sample-weighted mean correlation
 
was .11, while theirs was .24.
 
The results of these two meta-analytic studies provide support for
 
Hogan's (1992) conclusion on the use of personality measurement:
 
^^Despite the pessimistic conclusions of reviews published in the 1960's,
 
evidence gathered over the past three decades suggests that personality
 
inventories can make valid contributions to personnel selection and
 
assessment" (p.910), In fact, personality tests can be valuable for
 
selection purposes because of their incremental validity over cognitive
 
ability tests. Personality tests account for unique variance that is not
 
accounted for by cognitive ability measures. Another positive aspect of
 
personality tests is that they tend not to have adverse impact. That
 
is, they do not impact protected groups under Title VII more harshly
 
than majority groups. Thus, not only do personality tests add something
 
unique to measures of cognitive ability, they also reduce adverse impact
 
when used in combination with measures of cognitive ability (which do
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tend to show adverse impact). However, one issue that has been viewed
 
as potentially compromising thi^ established validity of personality
 
characteristics in predicting a variety of job relevant criteria is
 
dissimulation.
 
Faking in Personality Inventories
 
There is little doubt that faking in personality measures is
 
possible. Research has shown that subjects are capable of distorting
 
their scores on personality inventories when instructed to give as good
 
an impression as possible. Dicken (1960) investigated the
 
susceptibility of the California Psychological Inventory (CPI) to
 
response distortion. The CPI was administered to 100 introductory
 
psychology students. One group.of students was,instructed to respond to
 
the inventory in a manner that would give the most favorable impression
 
of themselves. Scores on the CPI for students in the ^^good impression"
 
condition were significantly higher than scores for subjects in the
 
standard test taking condition.
 
Hinrichsen, Giryll, Bradley, and Katahn (1975) examined the extent
 
to which the Fundamental Interpersonal Relations Orientation-Behavior
 
test (FIRO-B) is susceptible to faking. This test was given to 60
 
undergraduate students. There were three groups of subjects, each with
 
different instructions for taking the FIRO-B. The three instructional
 
conditions were normal (respond honestly), fake good (role play a job
 
applicant seeking to appear psychplogically well-adjusted), and fake bad
 
(give the impression of a maladjusted person). Results revealed that
 
scores on the FIRO-B were higher for subjects in the fake good condition
 
as compared to subjects in the normal and fake bad conditions. This
 
indicates that faking is quite possible for the FIRO-B.
 
Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp, and McCloy (1990) also found that
 
subjects are capable of distorting their responses to personality
 
measures in the desired.direction. These authors administered a
 
temperament inventory called ABLE (Assessment of Background and Life
 
Experiences) to over 9,000 military personnel. In one study, subjects
 
were instructed to either fake good (describe yourself in a way that you
 
think will ensure that the Army selects you), fake bad (describe
 
yourself in a way that you think will ensure that the Army does not
 
select you), or respond honestly (describe yourself as you really are).
 
Results indicated that when instructed to do so, soldiers did
 
significantly distort their responses. In a separate sample of
 
applicants at the Military Entrance Processing Station, the authors
 
identified those subjects who positively distorted their responses to
 
ABLE through a Social Desirability scale. The authors concluded that
 
the applicant sample did not significantly distort their responses since
 
the mean score was not significantly different from the mean score of
 
incumbents. Further, they concluded that response distortion did not
 
attenuate correlations between ABLE and measures of job performance.
 
The preceding studies are representative of the research that has
 
shown subjects are capable of positively distorting their scores on
 
personality inventories when instructed to give as good an impression as
 
possible. Because there is much evidence to show that faking in
 
personality assessment can occur, a primary concern is that the
 
information obtained from personality measures is invalid if faked. In
 
personnel selection, distorted personality measures are viewed as false
 
indicators of the traits that are supposed to predict job performance.
 
As Hough, et al. (1990) note, '''Indeed, the possibility of response
 
distortion is often cited as one of the main arguments against the use
 
of personality measures to aid in selection decisions'' (p. 581). One
 
way in which this concern is addressed is by the detection of faked
 
responses through social desirability scales.
 
Social Desirability and Impression Management
 
Socially desirable responding is probably the most extensively
 
studied response bias, and refers to the tendency to respond in such a
 
manner so as to make one's self look good (Paulhus, 1991). Researchers
 
have shown that responding in order to give a good impression (or faking
 
good) is related to the social desirability of the test items. Dunnett,
 
Koun, and Barber (1981) examined the degree to which the social
 
desirability of test items can distort the Eysenck Personality Inventory
 
(EPI). These authors administered the EPI to British subjects
 
(professionals as well as students) and instructed them to either
 
present themselves in the best possible light/ the worst possible light,
 
or as honest as possible. A separate group of subjects was asked to
 
rate each item on.the EPI in terms of its social desirability (how
 
acceptable and likable a person making such a statement would be viewed
 
by society). Results indicated that subjects in the fake good condition
 
scored significantly higher on the Extraversion scale of the EPI, and
 
significantly lower on the Neuroticism scale than subjects in the honest
 
condition. Moreover, '"fake good" subjects tended to endorse items that
 
correlated highly with the items the separate group of subjects rated as
 
socially desirable. Therefore, this study provides evidence that the
 
concepts of faking good to give a positive impression of oneself and
 
socially desirable responding are related.
 
In studies that have examined the susceptibility of personality
 
measures to faking, instructions to fake good include, ^'present yourself
 
in the best possible light" (Dunnett, et al., 1981, p.20); ""give the
 
most favorable possible impression of yourself^ (Dickeri/ 1960, p.,25);
 
^Mescribe yourself in a way that will ensure that the Army selects you"
 
(Hough, et al., 1990, p. 586). All of these descriptions instruct the
 
subjects to engage in what is known as impression management.
 
Impression management refers to the way in which people present a
 
positive impression of themselves to others. Giacalone and Rosenfeld
 
(1989) suggest that people are actors who take on many different roles.
 
We attempt to please our audiences using various impression management
 
tactics in order to avoid looking bad. Thus, we manage the impressions
 
we give to others to convey ourselves in the best way possible.
 
The instructions to ^^fake good" in the susceptibility to faking
 
studies cited above can be conceived of as impression management. In
 
personality inventories, people.who attempt to present themselves in the
 
best possible light (fake good) may in fact be engaging in impression
 
management tactics.
 
The issue of faking and impression management has been addressed
 
directly by Paulhus (1984), who has shown that social desirability
 
consists of two components - one of which is impression management.
 
Paulhus (1984) proposes that there are two types of socially desirable
 
response biases. He attempted to partition social.desirability
 
according to a two-factor model that consists of self deception and
 
impression management. Self deception is where the respondent honestly
 
believes his or her positive response distortion, and therefore it is
 
not a conscious attempt to dissemble. Impression management, on the
 
other hand, is where the respondent consciously distorts items in a
 
positive direction. Paulhus tested this two-factor theory through an
 
exploratory factor analysis of over 150 items from a battery of six
 
social desirability scales. Results revealed the two major factors that
 
Paulhus defined as self deception and impression management. These
 
results suggest that not only are impression management and social
 
desirability related, but impression management is actually one
 
component of a socially desirable response bias.
 
However, recent research by Shultz and Chavez (1994) suggests
 
that this two factor structure of social desirability may not hold true
 
for non Euro-American cultures. In their study, Shultz and Chavez
 
compared a social desirability scale completed in English to the same
 
scale completed in Spanish. Results indicated that while the two
 
factors, of social desirability (self deception and impression
 
management) held true for the English-version sample, the pattern did
 
not hold for the Spanish-version sample. Hence, researchers need .to
 
show caution in interpreting their results when translating scales into
 
a non-English language.
 
Impression Management and Self Monitoring
 
Just as impression management has been found to be a component of
 
social desirability, it has also been suggested to relate to self-^
 
monitoring. Snyder and Copeland (1989) propose that, A greater
 
understanding of the strategic dynamics involved in impression
 
management in organizational contexts may be gained by a consideration
 
of individuals' self-monitoring orientations" (p. 7). Snyder (1974)
 
describes self-monitoring as a construct which refers to the control of
 
self-presentational behaviors. People high in self-monitoring attend to
 
situational cues that guide their self-presentation of what they believe
 
to be appropriate behaviors. In contrast, low self-monitors only
 
display behaviors consistent with their true feelings, regardless of
 
situational cues.
 
It is reasonable to make the link between impression management
 
and self-monitoring because they are both processes of self
 
presentation. Arkin and Shepperd (1989) describe the prototypical
 
impression manager as the individual who is high in self-monitoring. In
 
order to know how and when to present the most favorable impression of
 
oneself, one needs to have the skill to choose the self-presentation and
 
social behavior appropriate to a variety of social situations (i.e., one
 
needs to be a high self-monitor).
 
Caldwell and O'Reilly (1982) conducted a laboratory experiment to
 
investigate whether high self-monitoring undergraduate business subjects
 
would be more likely to engage in impression management tactics than low
 
self-monitoring subjects. The procedure involved the subjects assuming
 
the role of an administrative manager. Subjects had to prepare a report
 
that explained their hiring decision (as manager) of an employee who
 
subsequently was discharged because of ineptitude. Subjects were
 
presented with a list of 34 items from which they were to select in
 
order to prepare the report. Items were independently judged and
 
categorized as reflecting either favorable or unfavorable infoimiation
 
concerning the manager's decision. The degree of subjects' self-

monitoring orientation was assessed by Snyder's (1974) self-monitoring
 
scale. Results indicated that subjects who were high self-monitors were
 
more likely to use items in the report that reflected favorably on their
 
decision processes and outcomes. Thus, high self-monitors tended to
 
endorse items that cast their decisions in a positive light - a tactic
 
that can be perceived of as impression management.
 
The results of Caldwell and O'Reilly's study, in combination with
 
Paulhus' work, suggest that it is reasonable to relate self-monitoring
 
and social desirability to the tendency to fake good on personality
 
measures/ Furthermore, Hogan (1992); states that impression management
 
is a tendency or trait that can be assessed by Snyder's ;(1974) Self-

Monitoring Scale; and Paulhus (1984) has developed a Balanced Inventory
 
of Desirable Responding (BIDR) that contains an Impression Management
 
subscale. Indeed, Merydith and Wailbrown (1991) assert that,
 
^dissimulation of presenting oneself in a favorable light is part of
 
social desirability^' (p. 898). Hence, faking-good is conceptually
 
linked to impression management and social desirability (Paulhus, 1984;
 
Merydith & Wallbrown, 1991) as well as self-monitoring (Snyder, &
 
Copelahd, 1989). =
 
While it is evident that these factors of social desirability,
 
impression management, /and self-monitoring are related to the tendency
 
to/fake good, this relationship as a whole has not.been empirically
 
tested. Moreover, the notion of faking good and its possible components
 
has not been conceptualized within a larger framework of response bias.
 
Faking Good and Response Bias
 
Paulhus (1991) defines response bias as ^''a systematic tendency to
 
respond to a range of questionnaire items on some bias other than the
 
specific content (i,e., what the items were designed to measure)" (p.
 
17). Response bias is a broad term which includes an entire range of
 
biases. Furnham (1986) lists some of these biases: socially desirable,
 
faking good, faking bad, acquiescence, nay saying, and extremity.
 
Depending on the consistency of the manner in which individuals respond,
 
a response bias could be a response set (a temporary response bias or a
 
reaction to situational demands), or a response style (a response bias
 
that is consistently displayed across time and in various situations).
 
That is, response styles represent consistent individual differences
 
(Paulhus 1991) while response sets are un-enduring reactions.
 
Dissimulation refers to a specific kind of response bias where the
 
respondent intentionally attempts to respond in a manner that will
 
convey a certain impression (Furnham, 1986; Merydith & Wallbrown, 1991).
 
Depending on one's motivation then, any type of response bias could be
 
viewed as dissimulation. Furthermore, depending on one's motivation and
 
intentions, dissimulation may be viewed as negative or natural- Elliott
 
(1981) reviews different interpretations of conscious dissimulation.
 
While some view it as lying, Cattel, Eber, and Tatsuoka (as cited in
 
Elliott, 1981) view it as produced 'half-unconscibusly'. in selection
 
contexts. Heilbrun (1964) asserts that responding in order to give a
 
good impression or appear socially desirable is not necessarily
 
deliberate dissimulation or lying. Responding in a socially desirable
 
manner is the way normal, healthy people respond.
 
Elliott (1981) argues that putting one's best foot forward in a
 
selection context is related to adaptiveness, If people lack the
 
ability to adapt or if they misperceive the appropriate norms and adapt
 
to something else, they are likely to be rejected" (p. 14). Seisdedos
 
(1993) is also a proponent of the predictive utility of the tendency to
 
fake good. He views faking good as an intelligent form of adaptation,
 
where individuals utilize all their capabilities to adapt to the
 
surrounding demands. He suggests that intentionally giving a good
 
impression is not a foimi of lying or deliberate faking: ^^It is not
 
hecessarily negative from the subject's viewpoint to show the best
 
^ego,' because, in some settings, that could be the way to adapt to the
 
circumstances" (p. 91). Thumin and Barclay,(1993) even propose that
 
those individuals with the tendency to fake good may be brighter, more
 
perceptive, and more insightful, and as such are the same individuals
 
who would perform particularly well on the job" (p. 15). Thus it would
 
10
 
appear that for some people/ and in some GirpijmistanceS/ faking, good is a
 
natural response style rather than a conscious mis-presentationv
 
Faking good is a type of response bias or form of dissimulation.
 
While some view^i^ as false presentation^ many view it as an adaptive
 
ability that leads to positive outcomes (Thumin &
 
BaiGlay, 1993i The tendency to fake good is also theoretically related
 
to self-^ social desirability/ and impressiph managemerit/ as
 
discussed above. However/ there is no model of response bias which
 
inGprporates: faking good and its possible comppnents^ In the present
 
study, I attempt to develop and test such aimpdel isee figure).
 
To the extent that there are reliable associations between faking 
gpod> self--inoriitQring/ social•desirability, and impression management, 
it is;worthwhile tP investigate how these factors may account for 
variance in individual differences in f,akihg good/ ; ■ 
Faking Good as an Individual Difference Variable ■ 
Rather Than a Contaminant . 
Faking good on selection instruments has been viewed as a
 
contaminant to the accuracy of self reports. People who score high on
 
socia1 desirabi1ity scales are assumed to be faking good {i.e., engaging
 
in impression management). Consequently, the reports of these
 
individuals are considered invalid, and are often rejected because they
 
are viewed as not tapping the construct of interest (Zerbe & Paulhus,
 
1987). However, it is important to distinguish between spurious effects
 
on personality scores and patterns of what may be personality structure.
 
To the extent that the effects of positive response biases are spurious,
 
validity is indeed threatened; but to the extent that there are
 
consistent effects based on the tendency to fake good/ then these
 
effects are potential individual difference variables that may be
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predictive in thei2: oWn right. In reviewing Cronbach's as^ertip^^^ on
 
response sets, Jackson and Messick (1958) suggest that the tendency to
 
fake good may ^ ''not always be teir^orary and trivial, but may have a
 
stable and valid component which reflects a Gonsistent individual style
 
or personality trait" (p. 244). Additionally, they suggest that for
 
certain circumstances, personal response styles (which are consistent
 
across time and situations) should be enhanced as opposed to being
 
.".'avoided :or:-corrected:.,
 
Instead of conceptualizing faking good as a contaminant or
 
something negative, the tendency to fake good can be conceiyed of as an
 
individual difference variable. Indeed, Furnham (1986) supports this
 
propositioh: /^Rather than considering social desirability a mere,
 
response artifact that threatens the validity of self-reports it should
 
be seen as a substantive trait useful in predicting beaviour" (p. 398)^
 
In his review of issues of faking in personality inventories, Hogan
 
- (1992) states:
 
... it seems reasonable to conclude that the ability to
 
enhance scores on a personality inventory is itself a
 
personality variable ... In this light, dissimulation, when
 
it exists, becomes less serious as a problem to overcome and
 
instead becomes an important individual differences variable
 
(p. 904).
 
Rynes (1993) likewise calls for further research on the ^""factors
 
that underlie individual differences in ^fake good' abilities" (p. 265).
 
Moreover, McCrae and Costa (1989) argue that faking good should be
 
considered a substantive trait that may be predictive of important
 
outcomes. Canter (1963) suggests that there is practical importance in
 
the ability of subjects to present a good picture of themselves, . .
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falsification of test scores and the capacity to do; so/inay be a
 
personality variable of considerable importance in its own right rather
 
than merely an undesirable and incidental factor to be ^corfected for"'
 
Canter (1963) conducted a study comparing the CPI responses of a
 
group of well-adjusted applicants to a group of presumably poorly
 
adjusted, involuntarily admitted alcoholic patients• Both groups wefe
 
encouraged to fake good in their responses by the instructions, ^ ^imagine
 
you are applying for a job you really want and your employer will judge
 
from this test whether to hire you or not. Answer the test in such a ^
 
way as to give the best possible impression of yourself" (p. 254).
 
Better adjusted subjects were able to increase their CPI scores more
 
than poorly adjusted subjects. This suggests that some people can
 
enhance their scores on personality tests more than others, and they are
 
distinguishable by good adjustment. This further supports -the nption:
 
that people differ in their tendency to fake good.
 
Summary
 
Taken together, these studies clearly support conceptualizing
 
faking good as an individual difference variable. Moreover, many
 
researchers have proposed the predictive utility of the tendency to fake
 
good. There has been much research to support that faking good can
 
happen; and there has been debate on whether or not, and to what extent
 
it threatens validity. However, what has not been examined is how
 
people differ in their tendency to fake good, and what factors can
 
distinguish between those who possess this tendency and use it, from
 
those who do not. Faking good is usually examined in terms of group
 
differences, and it appears that no study has attempted to treat the
 
tendency to fake good as a within-subject individual difference
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variable- Previous research has shown that faking .can happen (as
 
detected through group comparisons of honest and fake conditions);
 
however, there.is still no indicatioh of,why people can fake good. The
 
mbdel tested in the present study will help illuminate the underlying
 
reasons for why people can display this faking:good tendency.
 
There is valuable infoinnation that can be gained from identifying
 
the iactbrs that account for Variance in:the tendency;to fake good.
 
Research indeed Sugg ttiat this tendency may be predictive of
 
organizatipnal outcomes such as job performance (Kriedt & bawson, 1961;
 
Kacmary Delery, & Ferris, 1992; Ruch & Ruch, 1967; Wayne & Ferris,
 
1990) outcomes can be predicted.from this tendency, it
 
needs to be studied (1) within its framework of response bias; and,(2)
 
as it relates to and can be accounted for by other factors.
 
Implications
 
The present study will add important information to the research
 
on personality assessment and response bias because it appears that no
 
study has examined faking good as an individual difference variable,
 
even though many have called for this treatment (Canter, 1963; Furnham,
 
1986; Hogan, 1992; IJackson .& Messick, 1958; Rynes, 1993). Moreover, the
 
present study puts a unique perspective on the tendency to fake good in
 
that faking good is perceived hs a positive, adaptive, and potentially
 
predictive variable, as opposed to its usual treatment as a threat to
 
.validity (Hough, et al., 1990). Rather than examining how faking good
 
may or may not contaminate validity, we should investigate the
 
constructs to which it is related.
 
Moreover, this study is one of few that have attempted to assess
 
individual differences in faking good,through a:within-subje.ct
 
procedure Previous .research has detected the presence of faking good
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through group differences. People are only identified as faking good
 
when they are compared to the mean of the group in the honest condition.
 
This between-subject method fails to detect any differences among
 
individuals in the tendency to fake good. The present study not only
 
attempts to detect individual differences in faking good, but also
 
examines the potential factors that may explain variance in this
 
tendency.
 
It is anticipated that the results of this study will support the
 
hypothesis that SD, SM, and IM are all significantly related to the
 
tendency to fake good, and account for variance in this individual
 
difference variable. To the extent that this holds true, further study
 
of faking good as a predictor of important organizational outcomes is
 
warranted. Faking good may be related to job performance in certain
 
positions and circumstances (Kriedt & Dawson, 1961; Kacmar, Delery, &
 
Ferris, 1992; Ruch & Ruch, 1967; Wayne & Ferris, 1990). If these
 
relations between faking good, SM, SD, and IM are found to be robust,
 
and if the tendency to fake good is reliably predictive of job
 
performance in certain circumstances, faking good should not be
 
something in need of correction, but conceivably something for which can
 
be tested.
 
Hypotheses
 
1) it is hypothesized that there will be significant correlations
 
between the tendency to fake good on a personality inventory and the
 
concepts of self-monitoring (SM), social desirability (SD), and
 
impression management (IM). This model will be tested using structural
 
equation analysis, where the latent variables of SM, SD, and IM are
 
predicted to have positive paths to the latent variable of faking good
 
(see figure 1). This model will be statistically tested for ^goodness
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 of fit' to the sample data, which will be comprised of the observed,
 
variables of faking good, SM, SD, and IM. These observed variables will
 
be measured using their respective scales, while faking good will be
 
assessed by a within-subject technique discussed below.
 
2) To the extent that the factors of SM, SD, and IM are empirically
 
related to faking good, it is further hypothesized that those people who
 
:have the tendency to fake good on the personality inventory will be
 
distinguished by higher scores on SM, SD, and IM, while those who do not
 
exhibit the tendency to fake good will have lower scores on these
 
scales. Thus, SM, SD,- and IM will be multiple predictors of the tendency
 
to fake good, and will account for the variance in this tendency.
 
, .'V. • Method
 
f Subjects
 
323 subjects were recruited from undergraduate and graduate
 
Psychology courses at GSUSB. Gohenis power table (Gohen, 1992) suggests
 
that for three predictors and for medium power at a = .05, 76 subjects
 
per predictor should be used. Thus for the three predictors of SM, SD,
 
and IM, 228 subjects were required for adequate power.
 
. 225 of the participants were female, 92 were male, and 6 did not
 
specify. 43% of the participants were Caucasian, 24.5% were Hispanic,
 
13.9% were African American, 5.9% were Asian, 4.3% were Filipino, 1.2%
 
were Native American, 0.9% were Asian Pacific Islander, and 3.4%
 
indicated other. 29.4% of the sample were freshman, 23.5% were
 
sophomore, 12.7% were junior, 25.1% were senior, and 7.7% were graduate
 
students.
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Materials
 
The personality ineasur the iiistruitient on which the tendency
 
to fake was assessed- For the purposes of this study, it was important
 
to utilize a personaility measure that is (1) fakabler and (2) relevaiit
 
to the selection context described in the instructions to participants
 
(see the Procedure section), A persohality diinensioh|that: fits these
 
criteria is ConsGientiousness, part of the Big Five Personality
 
Dimensions. Conscientiousness describes one who is careful, thorough,
 
organized, planfui, harci~wdrkiiig> achievbrnerit,oriented, end persevering
 
(Barrick & Mount, 1991; Carver & Scheier, 1992 )- The concept of
 
consciehtiousness is termed differently by differentjauthors. A
 
compiletion of these synonymous labels is taken from Barrick and Mount
 
(1991) and Carver and Scheier (1992), and includes conformity,
 
dependability, will to achieve, responsibility, and ponscience. Peabody
 
and Goldberg (1989) suggest that conscientiousness relates to the life
 
domain of work, which would explain the ubiquitbusness of this
 
personality domain in job related contexts (Barrick & Mount, 1991),
 
Since this dimension of personality was used to measure the tendency to
 
fake, it was necessary to ensure that subjects who, were high in
 
GonscientiousheSs in both the honest and fake conditions (i.e., those
 
who displayed no sighificant increase in scores between the honest and
 
fake conditions to be described below) would not be confounded with
 
subjects who do not have the tendency to fake. That:is, subjects who
 
are at the ceiling for a personality construct have no room to enhance
 
their scores, and thus would not display an increase in scores from time
 
one to time two. These subjects would consequently be identified as not
 
faking good due to their high scores on the personality dimension.
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 In an effort to alleviate this potential ceiling confound,
 
subjects were assessed on all diinensions of the Big Five (Extraversion,
 
Emotional Stability, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Intellect)
 
using Saucier's (1994) Mini-Marker's for the Big Five (see appendix a),
 
This measure is a subset of Goldberg's 100 unipolar Big,Five markers,
 
and has comparable reliability to it (Saucier, 1994). Saucier (1994)
 
reported reliability coefficients for each dimension: Extraversion (a
 
= .83); Agreeableness (a = .81); Conscientiousness (a = ,83); Emotional
 
Stability (a = .78); and Intellect (a = .81). The present study used
 
Saucier's mini-markers in two conditions - honest and fake (see
 
procedure). The reliability coefficients on each dimension for the
 
honest condition include: Extraversion (a = .82); Agreeableness (a =
 
.76); Conscientiousness (a = .88); Emotional Stability (a = .72); and
 
Intellect (a = .77). The reliability coefficients for the fake good
 
condition were a = .76 for Extraversion, a = .79 for Agreeableness,
 
a ■- .92 for Conscientiousness, a = .76 for Emotional Stability, and a = 
.73 for Intellect. 
The tendency to fake good was assessed by a measure of the 
consistency of a given subject's responses to Saucier's Big Five Mini-
Markers (1994) under two conditions: honest and fake. This method 
involved correlating subjects' scores from the honest and fake 
conditions. Lautenschlager (1986) argues that this within-subject 
correlation (r„HF) is more sensitive to individual differences in faking 
than other methods; thus, it is certainly appropriate in the present 
study. As Lautenschlager (1986) notes: 
Large positive values will tend to indicate very
consistent subjects, generally those subject who 
change their responses very little under.the different 
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response [conditions] (It is possible that some of
 
these individuals are consistent fakers under both
 
response [conditions], but then no method outside of
 
external validation will detect them) . Strong
 
negative correlations will tend to indicate subjects
 
who go to different extremes under the two response
 
sets, i.e., exhibit the most faking. Thus, the range
 
of, valuer of the correlation indicate to some extent
 
the degree of accuracy with which a given individual
 
responds to the items under the F condition relative
 
to the H condition (p. 311).
 
Gordon and: Gross (1978) propose two other methods for detecting
 
faking: mean differences in scores that were obtained under the H and F
 
conditions (MeanF - Meann); and the variance of these same difference
 
scores . (S^d). Lautenschlager notes that the first method is insensitive
 
to individual differences in faking, but the second isn't. However, the
 
second is insensitive to constant discrepancies. Thus Lautenschlager's
 
method using within-subject correlations (Twrf) will be employed to
 
assess the tendency to fake good.
 
Self-Monitoring was assessed by Lennox and Wolfe's(1984) revised
 
Self Monitoring scale. As Lennox and Wolfe note, Snyder's (1974) SM
 
scale confounds acting ability with the ability to modify one's self
 
presentation in daily social interactions. Therefore, Lennox and Wolfe
 
(1984) developed a Revised Self-Monitoring Scale that defines the self-

monitoring construct in a more parsimonious and empirically logical
 
manner. Whereas Snyder's original scale has five components, the
 
present only has two. Snyder's multidimensional scale ''^extends beyond
 
the limits of the construct, creating a situation in which its factors
 
compete with one another" (Lennox and Wolfe, 1984, p. 1350). The
 
Revised Self-Monitoring Scale contains 13 items and two subscales:
 
ability to modify self presentation (coefficient alpha = .77), and
 
sensitivity to expressive behavior of others (coefficient alpha = .70).
 
The scale as a whole has a coefficient alpha of .75 (see appendix b).
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The inclusion of the sensitive to expressive behavior of others,is
 
justified given Snyder/s definition of the high self-monitor as one who
 
possesses the ability to attend to the behavior of others, and use it as
 
a cue to guide self presentation (Lennox &. Wolfe, 1984). This method of
 
assessing self^monitoring is congruent with its conception in the
 
present study, and thereby was the most appropriate way to measure it.
 
The present sample obtained a coefficient alpha = .726 ;for ability to
 
modify self presentation,, and a coefficient alpha = .668 for sensitivity
 
to expressive behavior of others. The scale as a whole had coefficient
 
alpha = .757. ^
 
Social Desirability was measured by using the total score for.
 
Paulhus/ Balanced^Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) which
 
measures two constructs: Impression Management and Self-Deceptive
 
Enharicement (se appendix c). When all items are summed fof a measure of
 
social desirable responding, the coefficient alpha is .83 (Paulhus,
 
1991)1 The coefficient alpha in the current sample for Social
 
Desirability is .820.
 
Impression Management will be assessed by Paulhus' Impression ;
 
Management subscale of the BIDR. Coefficient alphas range from .75 to
 
.86 for this subscale (Paulhus, 1991). The current sample obtained a
 
coefficient alpha = .816 for Impression Management. For the subscale of
 
Self-Deceptive Enhancement, coefficient alpahs range from .68 to .80
 
(Paulhus, 1991). The coefficient alpha for Self-Deceptive Enhancement in
 
the current sample is .65.
 
A measure of general intelligence was added as an exploratory
 
measure in i drder:to^ out the aitarnatiye hypothesis that general
 
:'intelligence (-^g") would account for more variance in the tendency to
 
fake good than SM, SD, or IM.; This m^ is a 40 item, spiral omnibus
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test of general intelligence (see appendix d). The reliability of this
 
measure in the present sairple is .834.
 
Procedure
 
Honest and fake conditions were operationalized by two different
 
instructions. Honest instructions encouraged the subjects to respond
 
honestly/, as they really are (see appendix A). Fake instructions asked
 
the subjects to place themselves in a selection context where they are
 
an applicant for a job that they desire. They were asked to respond to
 
the questions in a manner that they would use if they were an applicant
 
attempting to acquire the job. The instructions read:
 
Imagine that you are applying for a job that you really
 
want/ and your prospective employer will determine from this
 
test whether to hire you or not. Please use this list of
 
common human attributes to describe yourself so as to ensure
 
that you will get the job.
 
Before each attribute, please write a number indicating how
 
that trait were to describe you if you were trying to give
 
the best possible impression of yourselff using the
 
following rating scale:
 
The rating scale was the same as the honest condition. Subjects received
 
the measures for SM, SD, and IM during their honest condition.
 
Otherwise, subjects in the. fake condition may have been in a ^^fake'' mind
 
set, and consequently there could have been be carry over ''^fake''' effects
 
on these measures.
 
Results
 
The data were analyzed using bivariate scatter plots, scatter
 
plots of the residuals, and expected normal probability plots. It was
 
determined that the assumptions of linearity and normality were
 
basically met. The minimum and maximum values, means, standard
 
deviations, and coefficient alphas for the scales of self-monitoring
 
(SM), social desirability (SD), impression management (IM), self­
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deceptive enhancement (SDE), and the g measure are reported in table 1.
 
The reliabilities obtained in this sample for SM, SD, IM/ and SDE are
 
comparable to those reported by the authors of these scales. The means
 
and standard cteviatiohs for Sb and the two subscales (IM and SDE) are
 
comparable to what Paulhus reports (PaulhuSy Vl^Sl)- There were no
 
noirmative data available for the SM scale used in this study regarding
 
descriptives. The itiinimiim and maxiirium values, means, standard
 
deviations, coefficient alphas, and test-retest reliabilities for each
 
scale on the Big Five on both the honest and fake conditions are
 
reported in table 2. The reliabilities of the Big Five dimensions are
 
also comparable to the reliabilities reported by Saucier (1994). The
 
means and standard deviations for the within-subject correlations
 
between the honest and fake conditions for each dimension on the Big
 
Five are reported in table 3.
 
Participants significantly increased their scores from time one
 
(honest) to time two (fake) on each of the Big Five dimensions. Results
 
from these t-tests are reported in table 4. There were significant
 
correlations between means on the Big Five dimensions (both honest and
 
fake conditions) with SM, SD, IM, SDE, and the g measure (see table 5).
 
An interesting finding is the significant decrease in the correlations
 
with SD from the honest condition to the fake condition for
 
ConsGientiousness. On this dimension, there was a significant decrease
 
(Zobt = 2.43 > Z.025 = ±1.96, £ < .05) in the correlation between mean
 
scores in the honest condition and SD (r = .355, £ < .01) from the
 
correlation between the mean in the fake conditioh and SD (r = .210, £ <
 
.01). The correlation between the means on Conscientiousness and the g
 
measure significantly increased (£obt - -3.38 > £.025 = ±1.96, £ < .05)
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from the honest (r = .-.027, £• > .05) to the fake (r - .243, £ < .0^)
 
condition. The correlation between the means on Emotional Stability and
 
the g measure also significantly increased (j^obt = -2.02 > z.025 = ±1.96,
 
£< .05), from the honest {r = .105, £ < .01) to the fake (r = .266, £ <
 
.01) condition.
 
The within-subject correlations for the honest and fake conditions
 
(■^wHF/ the index for faking) were transformed to z scores using Fishery's 
r to z formula (Howell, 1992) in order to ensure an approximately normal 
sampling distribution of r„HF- These transfoimed within-subject 
correlations were not significantly correlated with SM, SD, nor 
IM for any of the Big Five dimensions. The correlations of these 
transformed within-subject correlations with scores on SM, SD, IM, SDE, 
and the g measure are reported for each Big Five scale in table 6. The 
r'wHF for Emotional Stability was significantly correlated with scores on 
the g measure (r = -.211; £<.01) . The r'wHF for Conscientiousness 
significantly correlated with scores on SDE (£ = .112; £<.05) . SM was 
significantly correlated with SD {r = .128, £ < .01) . IM (r = .899, £ < 
.01), and SDE (£ = .816, £ < .01) were also significantly correlated 
with SD, as would be expected since they are subscales of Social 
Desirability (see table 7) . 
Subjects tended to fake more (as evidenced by a lower average 
-zt'whf) on the scale of Agreeableness (M r'wHF = .3993, SD j^whf = .63601) 
than on Intellect (M t'wHF = .57508, SD x'whf = .62840) (£obt = -.2161 < £.025 
= ±1.96, a = .05) . Subjects also tended to exhibit more faking on 
Conscientiousness (M ^^whf = .38584, SD£whf = .47591) than on Intellect 
(Zobt = -2.3503 > Z.025 = ±1.96, a = .05) . 
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To examine the first hypothesis, a test of goodness of fit was
 
conducted using five multiple regression analyses. Using simultaneous
 
entry, the r'wHF for each scale was used as the criterion, and SM, SD,
 
IM, and the g measure were used as predictors. Results from these
 
multiple regression analyses are in table 8. Since these adjusted R as
 
goodness of fit indices were not significant (except for the Adjusted R
 
fob Emotional Stability, but even here it is extremely small) the
 
proposed structural equation analysis was not carried out.
 
- V Analyses were conducted on just the cases that were (1)
 
identified to be extreme fakers and (2) extremely consistent. This was.
 
done in order to isolate the effects occurring just for these extremes.
 
This was determined by selecting only those cases that were less than or
 
equal to the 33rd percentile, and greater than or equal to the 66th
 
percentile on the faking index for each of the dimensions. Thus,
 
extreme fakers were identified by very large, negative values for
 
-2^wHF(the lowest 33 percent for these values on each dimension); and
 
extremely consistent subjects were identified by very large and positive
 
values for r r^HF (the highest 33 percent for those values on each
 
dimension).. T-tests were performed in order to determine if extreme
 
fakers scored significantly higher on the dimensions in the honest and
 
fake conditions than the non-fakers. For the fake good condition on
 
Extraversion (time 2), extreme fakers (M = 6.72 , SD = 1.16) scored
 
significantly higher [t(209) = 3.584, £ < .000], than extreme non-fakers
 
fakers (M = 6.14 , SD = 1.17)., Extreme fakers (M =7.14,/^ =1.05)
 
also scored significantly higher than the extremely consistent subjects
 
(M =6.22, 1.36) on the fake condition of Emotional Stability
 
[t(209) = 5.517, £ < .0001. The extremely consistent subjects (M = 6.86
 
, SD = 1.05) scored significantly higher on the honest condition of
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Conscientiousness [t(212) = -3.802, £ < .000] than the extreme- fakers (M
 
= 6.33, SD = .989).
 
Originally/ r„HF was proposed as the index of faking. However
 
opposite to what was hypothesized, positive correlations between this
 
index and SM, SD, and IM were obtained. In order to get a broader sense
 
of the relationships between faking good and SM, SD, and IM, two other
 
indices of faking were calculated. These were Meanfake Meanhonest (Dra)
 
for each individual, as well as the within-subject variance of the
 
differences in responses to the items under the honest and fake
 
conditions (S^d)• Greater values for Dfh are associated with more faking
 
(a change in the positive direction from honest to fake). Greater
 
values of S^wd are also associated with more faking, while smaller values
 
indicate subjects who give very consistent responses. However, as
 
Lautenschlager (1986) notes, S^wd is insensitive to constant
 
discrepancies. Nevertheless, this index of faking was examined in an
 
effort to better understand the construct of faking good. When Dfh is
 
used as a measure of faking, it is evident by correlations with SM, SD,
 
and IM (see table 6) that faking good is negatively associated with
 
these constructs. That is, the more subjects tended to fake good (i.e.,
 
the greater the positive change from honest to fake) the lower these
 
subjects were on SM, SD, and IM. Additionally, Dfh as a faking index was
 
positiveiy correlated with higher scores on the g measure for
 
Extraversion, Conscientiousness, and Emotional Stability. However, when
 
S^wD is used as an index of faking, the relationship between faking good
 
and SM, SD, and IM is further clouded. The correlations between these
 
constructs and S^wd: ^ or each dimension of the Big Five are non
 
significant, and some are negative while others are positive. When S^wd
 
is used, there were significant correlations between SDE and faking good
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 for Agreeableness (r = .151, £ < .01), and Emotional Stability(r =,.119,
 
£ < .05). Moreover, faking good (S^wd) on Emotional Stability is
 
negatively associated with higher scores on the g measure (r = -.113, p
 
< .05).
 
Discussion
 
The hypothesis that faking good on a personality measure would be
 
correlated with the constructs of Self-Monitoring (SM), Social
 
Desirability .(SO), and Impression Management (IM) was not supported.
 
Faking good (as measured by the within-subject correlation between
 
scores on each of the Big Five scales in the honest arid fake conditions)
 
was not significantly correlated with any of the scales. Therefore in
 
the context of this study, students displayed the tendency to fake good
 
or not fake good regardless of their orientations on SM, SD, and. IM.
 
These results imply that faking good as an individual difference
 
variable is a unitary and separate construct, unrelated to constructs of
 
self-presentation.
 
A measure of general intelligence was employed in this study in
 
order to rule out an alternative hypothesis that ^''g" would account for
 
any potential individual differences in faking, rather than SM, SD, or
 
IM. There was no evidence for this alternative hypothesis. In fact,
 
faking good on Emotional Stability was negatively correlated with scores
 
on the g measure. Thus, those individuals, who displayed the tendency to
 
fake good on this particular dimension also scored lower on the g
 
measure. The fact that individual differences in faking good were not
 
felated to general intelligence lends more credit to the notion that
 
faking good is a unified and separate construct.
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One factor that may:have contributed to the non-significant
 
correlations between t'whf for each dimension; of the Big Five and, the :
 
scales of SM, SD, and IM is the lack of stability of these within-

subject correlations. These correlations were based on eight items
 
all dimensions of the Big Five (except Conscientiousness, which was
 
based on twenty items). These small N sizes produce unstable correlation
 
coefficients with very large confidence intervals. The width of the
 
confidence interval around r„HF for Conscientiousness is ± .4753, more
 
than one and a half standard deviation units. The width of the
 
confidence■intervals for Extraversion, Agreeableness> Emotibnai ; 
Stability, and Ihtellect i-s i: .8765, greater than two /Standard 
deviations for these' withih-subject correlations. Therefore the true 
values for r„HF across scales range from (plus or ndnus) one and a; half 
to two standard deviations from the obtained within-siibject ; / 
cofrelations. Given these confidence intervals, the within-subject: 
correlations must be interpreted with caution. indeed, Lautenschlager 
(1986) nbtes that when r„HF is used as an index of faking, Ibhger 
guestionnaires should, be employed in order to yield more stable within-
subject correlati6ns.Additionaily, large sample sizes should be used to 
control for individual differences in reliability. While the sample size 
of the current study appears to be sufficient, the nximber of items on 
which the within-subject correlations are based does not. 
Moreover, it is uncertain whether rwHF as a faking index is 
reliable. That is, it is not known whether individuals would obtain 
similar correlations between scores in the honest and fake conditions in 
another situation. If a measure is unreliable, it will have near zero 
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correlations with other constructs. Thus, further research on rwHF as a
 
faking index is indeed necessary.
 
Additional findings that lend discredit to the within-subject
 
correlations are the t-tests for the difference between the means on
 
each dimension from time one and time two. These results indicate that
 
subjects are significantly increasing their scores from the honest to
 
fake conditions. This would suggest that on the whole, subjects tended
 
to exhibit some degree of faking good. However, r„iiF as an index of
 
faking is not congruent with these t-tests. While there is variability
 
in the within-subject correlations, overall, subjects are fairly .
 
consistent in their responses from the honest to the fake conditions
 
(mean within-subject correlations ranged from .287 to .416).
 
In an effort to better understand the processes of faking good,
 
two other measures of faking were employed: Dfh and S^wd- Dfh is the
 
difference between scores in the fake and honest condition for each
 
dimension. S^wd is the within-subject variance of the differences in the
 
responses to each item under the two conditions of honest and fake. When
 
the results of the three indices of faking good are compared across
 
dimensions (see table 6), it is evident that each index reveals
 
something different about faking. While faking good (as operationalized
 
by strong, negative within-subject correlations) is not significantly
 
correlated with SD, SM, or IM, the difference scores from the conditions
 
of honest to fake are significantly and negatively correlated with SM,
 
SD, and IM. Analyses using the difference scores reveal that the more
 
subjects fake good, the lower the subjects score on SM, SD, and IM.
 
However, these conclusions are not upheld when S^wd is used as a measure
 
of faking. Analyses using the within-subject variances of the
 
differences as a measure of faking yield insignificant and erratic
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correlations. Thus, regardless of which index of faking is used, faking
 
good is still unrelated to the constructs of SM, SD, and IM, This
 
further supports faking good as an independent construct.
 
Another notable result is that on Conscientiousness, the
 
correlations between the mean scores on this dimension and SD
 
significantly decreased from the honest to fake conditions.
 
One explanation for this decrease in correlations from the honest to
 
fake conditions may be method variance. That is, the differences in
 
these correlations may not be indicative of a true relationship. For
 
instance, in the honest condition the correlation for the means on
 
Conscientiousness and SD was .355.. In the fake condition, this
 
correlation dropped to .210. This is a significant difference in the
 
correlations (Zobt = 2.43 > £.025 = ±1.96, p < .05). Scores on SD may have
 
been affected by subjects' responses to the Big Five in the honest
 
condition, which they completed before any of the other measures. In the
 
honest condition, one would expect significant correlations between
 
means on the Big Five dimensions with scores on SD since subjects'
 
responses to items on the Big Five will influence their subsequent
 
responses to the measures that follow it (SM, SD, IM). However, subjects
 
did not get a second administration of SM, SD, and IM in the fake
 
condition. Responses to the Big Five in the fake condition are
 
influenced by a new instructional set, and therefore, means at time 2 on
 
the dimensions would not likely be as correlated with SD as means on the
 
dimensions at time one. Any genuine differences that may exist between
 
honest and fake conditions concerning the relationship of a dimension
 
and SD could only be revealed and interpreted had these measures been
 
given at time two.
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In addition to possible method variance accounting for the
 
differences in these correlations^ recent meta-analytic work using 239
 
studies (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1995) shows that scores on measures
 
of Conscientiousness are typically correlated about .20 with measures of
 
Social Desirability. Thus it would appear that perhaps the correlation
 
between Conscientiousness and SD at time two (r = .210, £ < .01) is
 
approaching this ^^true" correlation between the two constructs.
 
Conversely, the correlation between Conscientiousness and SD at time
 
one, where subjects received both measures (r = .355, £ < -01), may be
 
an inflated indication of the relationship due to potential method
 
variance.
 
Limitations
 
Factors that may have contributed to the unexpected findings of
 
this study include the limitations associated with using a college
 
student population as participants, as opposed to actual job applicants.
 
The instructions for the fake good condition asked subjects to place
 
themselves in a selection context where they were an applicant for a job
 
that they really desire. They were asked to respond to the questions in
 
a manner that they would use if they were seriously attempting to land
 
the job. Students participating in this study were possibly not as
 
motivated to respond in. the manner of a job applicant. They did not
 
have a vested interest in the outcome of obtaining or not obtaining the
 
desired job. It is reasonable to suggest that individual differences in
 
the tendency to fake good may manifest themselves differently depending
 
on the situation; and in this particular study, subjects' tendency to
 
fake good may not have been elicited with the instructions alone. Even
 
though there was variance in the values and magnitudes of the faking
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index (r'^Hr)/ perhaps different results would have been attained had an
 
applicant population been used.
 
Contrary to what would be expected given the instructions to fake
 
good, some participants actually decreased their scores in the fake good
 
condition as compared to their scores in the honest condition. Across
 
dimensions, between 10 to 30 percent of the subjects had negative values
 
for Dfh. This decrease in scores indicates that subjects actually faked
 
bad in the fake good condition. Unfortunately, strong, negative values
 
of the within-subject correlations would mis-^identify those subjects as
 
fakers since their scores were indeed inconsistent from the honest to
 
the fake condition.
 
Another possible limitation could be the ceiling confound. While
 
an attempt was; made to alleviate this potential confound by using^^ more:
 
than one perspnality dimension, it is possible that the people who are
 
the actual fakers in this samp^ scored high across all
 
dimensions in the honest condition. In time two, when these true"
 
fakers were instructed to fake gobd, they had no room to further enhance
 
their scores given their previous high scores in the honest condition.:
 
If this was the case/ these true fakers were identified as extremely
 
consistent subjects (with large, positive values for r'whf)/ und thus
 
mis-identified as extreme non-fakers. In his discussion of r^r as a:
 
measure .of faking, Lautenschlager (1986) notes a possible interpretation
 
of large, positive values for r„HF/ is possible that some of these
 
individuals are consistent fakers under both response sets, but then no
 
method outside of external validation will detect them.'' (p. 311). If
 
the real fakers were mis-identified as consistent respondents, then the
 
correlations between r'„HF for each dimension and SM, SD, and IM are
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inaccurate indicators of the relationship between faking good and these
 
Gonstruets- Moreover, the difference scores (Dfh) would also fail to
 
identify these consistent fakers since they would have little change in
 
their scores. Finally, S^wd would also fail to identify these consistent
 
fakers since their values for the within-subject variance of the
 
differences would likewise be small, causing these people to be treated
 
as consistent respondents. Thus, given the current methods for
 
detecting faking, there appears to be no way to identify those
 
consistent fakers who initially score high in time one, and
 
correspondingly in time two. This limitation in measuring faking
 
cohtaininates any association that may exist between:faking good and, SM>
 
.,SD,V and ■ . ^ 
Theoretical Implications
 
The information re^a^ faking good as an individual difference
 
variable obtained from this study is valuable because it shows that
 
people do vary in their tendency to fake good on a personality measure;
 
and people vary in this tehdency depending on the particular dimension
 
of persohality being assessed- Analyses of the differences between the
 
means of the transformed within-subject correlatiphs reveal that
 
more faking tended to occur on the eonscientiousness dimension thari on
 
the Intellect dimension, and more faking occurred on the Agreeableness
 
dimension than on the Intellect dimension. This is evidenced by the
 
lower within-subject correlations on Conscientiousness and Agfeeableness
 
than on Intellect.
 
Moreover, results of this study suggest that faking good is its
 
own construct. Faking good was not related to any of the hypothesized:
 
constructs, not even general intelligence. Even though the tendency to
 
fake good was not found to be related to SM, SD, nor IM, it was
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nevertheless found to be an individual difference variable. Future
 
research should continue to address faking good as an individual
 
difference variable, and identify the situations and circumstances in
 
which this tendency will, and will not be manifested.
 
Whether these findings are indicative of true relationships
 
remains to be tested with more accurate and stable measures of faking.
 
In the current study, it is unclear whether faking good truly is
 
unrelated to SM, SD, and IM, or whether faking good failed to be
 
captured by the measures of faking that were utilized. Additionally, the
 
current indices of faking are incapable of differentiating those people
 
who score high in the honest condition across personality dimensions and
 
are truly those who would display the tendency to fake good, from those
 
people who are consistent from honest to fake conditions and who would
 
not display this tendency.
 
Future Research
 
Therefore the current study has exposed three avenues for future
 
research. The first involves developing better methods for measuring
 
faking, since the three utilized in this study all revealed different
 
results regarding faking. Secondly, if is used in future studies,
 
longer measures of personality should be used in order to produce more
 
reliable within-subject correlations. By increasing the length of the
 
measures, not only will the stability of r^HF be increased, but a more
 
accurate measure of this construct will be obtained. Indeed, Ones and
 
Viswesvaran {in press) note that in order to increase the criterion-

related validities of Conscientiousness, more than one Conscientiousness
 
scale should be used in prediction because the criterion-related
 
validity of a composite of Conscientiousness scales is higher than any
 
one measure of Conscientiousness. Hence, it is not unreasonable to
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administer a longer, aggregated scale of Conscientiousness in order to
 
obtain more stable estimates of Twrf as well as the construct of
 
Conscientiousness itself. However it is important to note that the
 
within-subject correlations between responses from the honest to fake
 
conditions is more a measure of consistency of pattern rather than
 
consistency of level/ and thus may not be the most appropriate measure
 
of faking. Thirdly, future design methods for research in faking good
 
should include an administration of the independent variables during the
 
fake good condition as well as the honest condition in order that more
 
accurate interpretations of the decreased correlations from honest to-

fake conditions can be made. Additionally, these measures of SM, SD, and
 
IM should also be given at a time before the personality measure is .
 
administered. in this way, a more pure assessment of these constructs
 
can be made since the threat of method variance that was introduced in
 
the current study can be reduced.
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■Table 1 > . -
Means and Standard Deviations for Self-Monitoring^ 
Deceptive Enhancement,. , and the g measure 
Social Desirability^ Impression Management^ Self-" 
. Scale 
Self-Monitoring^ 
Social Desirability^ 
Impression Management^ 
Self-Deceptive Enhancement^ 
g Measure^ 
Number of 
Iterns 
13 
40 
20 - : 
20 
40 
Total 
Possible 
5 
40 
20 
V 20 ■ 
40 
Minimum 
1.77 
1 
0 
0 
3 
Maximum 
4.85 
31. 
15 
17 
37 
Mean 
3.32 
11.40 
5.48 
5.92 
16. 64 
SD 
.529 
5.55 
3.37 
3.19 
6.24 
Coefficient 
alpha 
.757 
.783 
.724 
.650 
.834 
a; 
b: 
c-.; ■ 
d: 
N 
N 
N 
N 
= 
= 
= 
323 
321' 
312 
314 
LO 
CO 
 Table 2
 
Meansy Standard Deviations^ Reliability Coefficients/ and Test-Retest Reliabilities for all Big Five
 
Dimensions (honest and fake conditions) 
Test-Retest 
Reliability 
Scale n Minimum Maximum Mean SD Coefficient for 
a T1 & T2 
Extraversion (honest)^ 1.5 8.75 5.73 1.41 .383 
Extraversion (fake) ^  318 8.88 6.49 1.17 .761 
Agreeableness (honest) ^  322 3.88 9 7.11 1.20 .767 .524 
Agreeableness (fake) ^  321 3.75 9 7.62 1.02 .796 
Conscientiousness (honest)^ 318 3.7 8.75 6.68 1.01 .883 .453 
Conscientiousness (fake) ^ 314 3.5 9 7.65 1.00 .922 
Emotional Stability(honest) ^  00 
00 
, 319 2.12 8.88 5.33 1.30 .728 .383 
Emotional Stability (fake) ^  317 3 9 6.76, 1.26 .761 
00 
Intellect (honest) ^  322 2.62 9 6.47 1.18 .772 .468 
Intellect (fake) ^  319 2.65 9 6.92 1.01 .732 
Total possible score on all scales. honest and fake. is 9. 
a: number of items = 8 
b: number of items = 20 
00
 
CO
 
MC
 
00
 
K>
 
O
 
 Table 3 . •
 
Means and Standard Deviations for the Within-Subject Correlations of the
 
Honest and Fake Conditions (r^Ew) for Each Scale of the Big Five
 
Scale M Minimum Maximum Mean SD
 
Extraversion Xwef 321 -.933 .3596 .'4230
 
Agreeableness r^^HF
 299 -.820 .2871 .4401
 
Conscientiousness r^HF
 311 -.509 ■ .999 .3120 .2974
 
Emotional Stability 318 -.945 \ 1.00 .3166 .4130
 
Intellect t^hf 312 -.845 1.00 .4155 .4111
 
o
 
o
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Table 4
 
Results from T-tests on the Differences Between Means on Time 2 (fake) and Time 1 (honest) for each
 
Dimension on the Big Five ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ — :
 
95% Confidence
 
Interval of
 
Mean 1 Mean 2 Difference Significance the Difference
 
Scale (honest) (fake) (Mean 1 - Mean 2) t df (two-tailed) Lower Upper
 
Extraversion 5.74 6.48 -.746 -10.31 314 .000 
-.888 ZYsW'
 
Agreeableness- 7.11 7.62 
-.516 -8.91 319 iooo 
-.630 -.402
 
Conscientiousness 6.69 7.65 -.955 -16.1 312 .000
 -1.07 -.839
 
Emotional Stability 5.33 6.75 -1.42 -17.71 315 ,000 -1,58 -1.26
 
Intellect 6.47 6.92 
-.452 -7.03 318
 .000 -.578 -.325
 
06
 
00
 
  
 
 
Table 5 
Correlations Between Scores on the Big Five Dimensions <honest and fake conditions) and Self-
Monitoring^ Social Desirability^ Impression Management/ Self-Deceptive Enhancement^ and the g Measure 
Self-­ Social Impression Self-Deceptive g 
Monitoring Desirability Management Enhancement measure 
Extraversion (mean 1) .183** ^060^ .255** - .034 
Extraversion (mean 2) .284*^ .180** .098 .211** .069 
Agreeableness (mean 1) .045 .304** .361** .147** .032 
Agreeableness (mean 2) .047 .219** .260** ,107 .076 
Conscientiousness (mean 1) .121^ .355** .365** .234** - .027 
Conscientiousness (mean 2) .127* .210** .220** .133** .243** 
Emotional Stability (mean 1) - .082 .363** .337** .277** .105 
Emotional Stability (mean 2) .001 .243** .242** .167** .266** 
cr> 
00 
Intellect (mean 1) .182** .179** .116* .188** .127* 
Intellect (mean 2) .182** .108 .099 .082 .115* 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-taiied). 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2"-tailed) 
  
 
 
■■Table;6; ' 
Correlations Between All Indices of Faking Across All Big Five Dimensions 
Extraversion 
Self-
Monitoring 
Social 
Desirability 
Impression 
Management 
Self-Deceptive 
Enhancement 
Dhp 
' -064 
-.140^ 
-.025 
.059 
-.035 
-.016 . 
.054 
.024 
-.041 
- .045 
-.087 
.017. 
-.087 
.111* 
-.062 
Agreeableness 
: : ; 
Dhf 
. ■ S'^WD : ■ 
.025 
-.006 
-.,032. . 
-.039 
-.109 
.051 
. -.030 
-.129* 
-.059 
-.035 
-.054 
.151** 
-.011 , 
.034 
-.103 , 
Conscien.tiousness 
r'wHF 
. Dar 
S^„D 
.070 
.011 
-.026 
.082 
-.139* 
-.012 
\ 
.033 
-.141* 
-.100 
.112* 
-.094 
.085 
-.085 
.265** 
-.105 
o 
Emotional Stability, 
r'wHF 
S\d ■ 
, . 
.071 
.012 
.040 
-.115* 
.027 
. 
. 
.060 
-.091 
-.068 
.006 
-.105 
.119* 
-.211** 
.141*, 
-.113*, 
intellect 
r'„HF 
Dhf 
s\d 
-.048 
-.031 
-.063 
.070 
-.095 
.047 
.012 
-.037 
.050 
.110 
-.125* 
.028 
.029 
-.030 
-.090 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed) . 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) . 
Table 7
 
Pearson Correlations Between Self-Monitoring^ Social Desirability/ Impression Management^ and Self-

Deceptive Enhancement and the g Measure
 
Social Impression Self-Deceptive 9
 
Desirability Management. Enhancement Measure
 
Self-Monitoring .138* -.016 .257** -.622
 
Social Desirability 	 .855** .837** -.003
 
-	 Impression Management .432** .015
 
Self-Deceptive Enhancement -.021
 
** Correlation is.significant at. the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
 
 Table-8 . .
 
Results from Multiple Regression Analyses as Tests of Goodness of Fit.
 
R R Adjusted R df F 
__ _____ 
Extraversion TTsr 
314 
Agreeableness .037 .001 -.021 4 .100 
232 
Conscientiousness .160 .026 ,013 4 1.99 
304 
^Emotional Stability .242 .059 .047 4 4.842*** 
311 
Intellect ,098 .01 -.003 4 .734 
305 
* Significant beta weight for g measure (>ff = -.215; p < .001)
 
*** Correlations significant at the ,001 level.
 
Note: The independent variables are Self Monitoring, Social
 
Desirability, Impression Management, and the g Measure. The Dependent
 
Variables for each of the multiple regressions are the transformed,
 
within-subject correlations for the respective Big Five dimensions.
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 Appendix A .
 
Mini Markers (Saucier, 1994)
 
How Accurately Can You Descril>e lff"ourself?
 
Please use this list of common human attributes to describe yourself as
 
accurately as possible. Describe yourself as you see yourself at the present
 
time, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe yourself as you are
 
generally or typically, as compared with other persons you know of the same
 
sex and of roughly your same age.
 
Before each attribute, please write a niomber indicating how accurately
 
that trait describes you, using the following rating scale:
 
inaccurate Accurate 
Extremely Very Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
1 2 3 : 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Bashful Neat
 
Bold Negligent
 
Careful Organized
 
Careless Philosophical
 
Cold Practical
 
Complex Prompt
 
Conscientious Quiet
 
Cooperative Relaxed
 
Creative Rude
 
Deep Shy
 
Disorganized Sloppy
 
Efficient Steady
 
Energetic Sympathetic
 
Envious Systematic
 
Extraverted Talkative
 
Fretful Temperamental
 
Haphazard Thorough
 
Harsh Touchy
 
Imaginative Uncreative
 
Impractical Undependable
 
Inconsistent Unenvious
 
Inefficient Unintellectual
 
Intellectual Unsympathetic
 
Jealous Unsystematic
 
Kind Warm
 
Moody tothdrawn
 
*Note that these direction differ for the ^^fake'' condition.
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Appendix B
 
'Revised Self-Monitoring Scale (Lennox & Wolfe^ 1984^ p. 1361)
 
Subscale/item M SD
 
Ability to modify self-presentation
 
1. In social situations, I have the
 
ability to alter my behavior if I
 
feel something else is called for.
 
3. I have the ability to control the way 3.2 1.0
 
I come across to people, depending on the
 
impression I wish to give them.
 
7. When I feel that the image I am 2.4 1.1
 
portraying isn't working, I can readily
 
change it to something that does.
 
*9. I have trouble changing my behavior 3.1 1.2,
 
to meet the requirements of any situation
 
I find myself in.
 
10. I have found that I can adjust my 3.1 1.0
 
behavior to meet the requirements of any
 
situation I find myself in.
 
*12. Even when it might be, to my 2.8 1.2
 
advantage, I have difficulty putting up a .
 
good front.
 
13. Once I know what the situation calls 3.0 1.0
 
for it's easy for me to regulate my
 
actions accordingly.
 
Sensitivity to expressive behavior of
 
others
 
2. I am often able to read people's true 3.2 1.0
 
emotions correctly through their eyes.
 
4. In conversations, I am sensitive to 3.4 1.3
 
even the slightest change in the facial
 
expression of the person I'm conversing
 
with.
 
5. My powers Of intuition are quite good 3.7 .09
 
when it comes to understanding others'
 
emotions and motives.
 
6. I can usually tell when others 3.5 1.0
 
consider a joke to be in bad taste, even
 
though they may laugh convincingly.
 
8. I can usually tell when I've said 3.8 .08
 
something inappropriate by reading it in
 
the listener's eyes.
 
11. If someone is lying to me, I usually 3.1 1.0
 
know it at once from that person's manner
 
of expression.
 
* Indicates items that are reversed coded.
 
Response format is a six point, Likert type scale:
 
0 = certainly, always false
 
1 = generally false
 
2 = somewhat false
 
3 = somewhat true, ,but with exception
 
4 = generally true ^
 
5 = certainly, always true
 
r with . r with 
subscale total 
.42 .29 
.46 .45 
.45 .41 
.56 .46 
.60 .48 
.30 .28 
.65 .54 
.42 .40 
.36 .22 
.47 .32 
.35 .31 
.53 .44 
.42 .29 
45
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C
 
BIDR Version 6 - form 40 (Paulhus, 1991).
 
Using the scale below as a,guide, write a number beside each statement
 
to indicate how much you agree with it.
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 
NOT TRUE 	 SOMEWHAT VERY TRUE
 
TRUE
 
1. My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right.
 
*2. It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits.
 
___ 	3. I don't care to know what other people rally think of me.
 
*4. I have not always been honest with myself.
 
5. I always know why I like things.
 
*6. When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking.
 
___ 7. Once I've irtade up mind, other people can seldom change my
 
opinion.
 
*8. I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit.
 
9. I am fully in control of my own fate.
 
*10. It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought.
 
11. I never, regret my decisions. 
*12. I sometimes miss out on things because I can't make up rny 
mindVsoph"enough '. v;:'; ; -r" ■ 'v.­
^	 13^ The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference.
 
^14,^ ^ : M^ were; not always fair when they punished me^
 
i 15. am a completely rational person. .
 
; \;*i'6.v.;''' .;I. rarely appreciate criticism.
 
17. I am very confident of my judgments^
 
;;: -*18;..' I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover.
 
19. It's all right, with me if some people happen to dislike me. 
"v-*20. '■ ,i don't always know the reasons why I do the things I do. 
• *21. I sometimes telT lies if I have to. 
novor cover up my mistakes.
 
' *23. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of
 
someone.
 
24. I never swear.
 
*25. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forgetv
 
26. I always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get caught.
 
*27. I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her
 
back.
 
. 28. When I hear people>talking privately, I avoid listening.
 
*29. I have received too much change from a salesperson without
 
telling him or her.
 
30. I always declare everything a customs.
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*31. 	When I was young I sometimes stole things..
 
32. I have never dropped litter on the street.
 
*33. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit.
 
34. I never read sexy books or magazines.
 
*35. I have done things that I don't tell other people about.
 
36. I never take things that don't belong to me.
 
*37. 	I have taken sick-leave from work or school even thought I
 
wasn't really sick.
 
38. I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise
 
without reporting it.
 
*39. I have some pretty awful habits.
 
40. I don't gossip about other people's business.
 
Items 1-20 assess Self-Deceptive Enhancement; items 21-40 assess
 
Impression Management.
 
* indicates items keyed in the false" (negative) direction.
 
47
 
  
 
 
Appendix D.
 
DIRECTIONS
 
• This is an exercise to appraise your knowledge of general information.
 
Please answer the questions to the best of your ability. This portion
 
should take no more than 12 minutes.
 
• Answer the questions by putting the,correct answer within the parentheses.
 
You should not use any outside resources to complete these questions.
 
•	The following two questions are examples.
 
The 	opposite of down is:
 
1. 	east 2. under 3. up 4. cover
 
( UP )
 
"What is your change from $1.00 when you buy one item costing 16 cents and a
 
second item costing 34 cents? (50 cents)
 
Please Begin Answering the Questions
 
1. 	A person who is elated is:
 
1. sad 2. Angry 3. Happy 4. Gifted 5, Passive .,..( )
 
2. 	Which of the following is most unlike the others?
 
1. Typewriter 2. Desk 3. Cabinet 4, Stove 5. Calculator ....( )
 
3. 	Work is to pay as practice is to:
 
1. Wealth 2. Curiosity 3, Happiness 4. Skill 5. Tired ......( )
 
4. 	Square is to circle as cube is to:
 
1. Rectangle 2. Pyramid 3. Sphere 4. Trapezoid 5. Triangle ( )
 
5. 	Eight percent of $20,000 is equal to sixteen percent
 
of what amount? .....( )
 
Continued on the next page
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6. 	Consider the following:
 
A is larger than B
 
C is smaller than D
 
C is larger than A
 
Which is the
 
largest? .................... 	 ( )
 
7. 	To alleviate is to:
 
1. Hasten 2. Ease 3 Prolon 4. Restrict 5. Change .....( )
 
8. 	When the following are arranged in an increasing sequence, what is the
 
first letter of the third word:
 
Square Cube Li^e Point 	 ( )
 
9. 	Permissive does not mean:
 
1. 	Restrictive 2. Allowable 3. Loose
 
4. 	Pardonable 5. Agreeable ... .( ),
 
10. 	Which is the best example of an entrepreneur?
 
1. 	Usher 2. Foreman 3. Fireman 4. Grocer
 
5. 	Janitor ( )
 
11. If you had 13 cases of beans, 20 cases of carrots, 17 cases of pears and
 
11 cases of corn, how many cases of vegetables would you have?..( )
 
12. l^ich has the most similar meaning to lazy?
 
1. Indulgent 2. Insolvent 3. Indolent 4. Inertia
 
5, Involucrum )
 
13. What should the first two numbers in this series be?
 
16 4 9 3 4 2 ,.( )
 
14. 	Which of the following is most unlike a triangle?
 
1. 	Square 2. Trapezoid 3. Rectangle 4. Circle
 
5. 	Hexagon ...( )
 
15. A storage space measures 18 ft. x 10 ft. x 10 ft^
 
What portion of this space will be occupied by 300 crates,
 
each 3 ft. x 1 ft. x 1 ft in size? 	 ......( )
 
Continued on the next page
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16. Il'-Thich word is least appropriate in the group below?,
 
1. Rock 2. Metal 3. Salt 4. Fish 5. Water .....( )
 
17. What is the next number in the following sequence?
 
1 3 V 6 10 15 . ........................w.( )
 
18. Fred, Alice, and George own 1/4, 5/12, and 1/3 of a company,
 
respectively. The profits least year were $120,000. How much less
 
would Alice have earned if the profits were divided evenly,
 
rather,than on the above basis? )
 
19. Aristotle is to philosophy what Samuelson is to:
 
1. History 2. Literature 3. Mathematics 4. Agriculture
 
5. Economics ................... ( ^ )
 
20. What is the last letter of the third word when the following is rearranged
 
to make a complete sentence?
 
orod poen eht ............. ......( )
 
21. A man paid 20% income tax on his yearly income of $15,500.
 
The government returned 10% of the amount of tax paid.
 
How much was he taxed for the year? ( )
 
22. What is the next number in the series?
 
2 5 11 23 . ( )
 
23. A flipped coin comes up heads three consecutive tosses.
 
The chances for heads on the fourth toss are:
 
1. 1 in 1 2. 1 in 2 3. 1 in 3
 
4. 1 in 4 5 1 in 5 ..( )
 
24. Peter borrowed $25,000 at a 7 1/2 percent rate per annum. He received a
 
bill for a quarterly interest payment. What was the amount?.....( )
 
25. Which number or letter in the following sequence is incorrect?
 
1 D 3; E 5 F 6 G 9 H ........( )
 
26. The sum of three consecutive even numbers is 102.
 
What is the smallest number? )
 
27. Sedate is most siiailar to:
 
1. Composed 2. Affected 3. Angry 4. Concerned 5. Select ... ( )
 
Continued on the next page
 
50
 
28. "What is the missing, fraction in the following, series?
 
374 11/16 9/16 1/2 .r
 
29. Assiame the following two statements are true. ''''All conservatives are
 
businessmen. Bob is a liberal." From this, you can deduct:
 
1. Bob is not a businessman.
 
2. Bob is a businessman
 
3. Bob may or may not be a businessman.
 
4. None of the above.
 
5. Two of the above • • • ( )
 
30. A famous anthropologist is:
 
1. Aristotle 2. Freud 3. Mead 4. Darwin 5. Pavlov ..... ( )
 
31. Which of the following does not belong?
 
1. French 2. Spanish 3. Italian 4. Russian 5. Portuguese ...( )
 
32. A watch loses 20 seconds every 10 hours. If it has been properly set at
 
6:00 a.m. on Monday, how slow will it be by noon on Tuesday? ...( )
 
33. What is the missing number?
 
12 21 23 32 , 54 67 76 ... ( )
 
34. A freight train one mile long goes through a tunnel that is one mile long.
 
If the train is traveling at a speed of 15 miles per hour, how long does
 
it take to pass through the tunnel? ......( )
 
35. Satiate is the same as:
 
1. Jailed 2. Incarcerate /3. Slovenly 4. Free 5. Satisfy ....( )
 
36. A department, working at 80 percent efficiency, produces 640 pieces per
 
hour. What is the efficiency when this department produces 760 pieces per
 
hour? ........( )
 
37. The manpower requirements for a certain plant are: first shift, 600;
 
second shift, 2/3's as itiany; and third shift, 1/2 of the total of the
 
first two shifts. How many total people are required for the three
 
shifts? )
 
38. What is the first letter of the third word when the following are arranged
 
in their proper order?
 
1. Broke 2. Cereal 3. Go 4. Baby 5. The ( )
 
Continued on the next page
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39. Two small planes leave cities 970 miles apart and travel toward each
 
other, one plane's average speed is 40 miles per hour greater than that of
 
the other plane. If they meet in two and one-half hours, what is the speed
 
of the slower plane? ..> ...( )
 
40. Moon is to sun as:
 
1. Day is to night
 
2. Light is to dark
 
3. Fork is to tea
 
4. Friend is to foe
 
5. Sea is to land .( )
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